China’s based lasers expose U.S satellites to increased vulnerability

In January of last year (2019), the Defense Intelligence Agency issued a warning stating that China will deploy a group-based laser missile, which will counter low-space situated sensors. Also, in the signal, by the time it is the mid-2020s, the rocket could deploy stable power structures, which in turn may destroy non-optical satellite systems. 

The actual threat of the missile

According to analysts, there are already five Chinese laser buildings locations. One is found in Xinjiang and has four buildings. One of the buildings seems to have tracing satellites, while the device on the other three buildings aids in disabling of satellite sensors. Xinjiang is just a representative of all the other four; the other five areas can be traced since they are susceptible to aerial attacks. 

Apart from these bases, China manages other laser varied stations, which aided in examining orbits of individual satellites as well as space junk. However, the lasers can be used to launch an attack on the U.S and its friend countries. 

Out of the 50 satellite laser varied stations in the world, five laser stations are located in Shanghai, Changchun, Kuming, and Wuhan. Two of the satellite stations are movable. 

At Shanghai laser satellite station, the different system uses a laser with a low power of 2.8 watts. The amount of electricity used on other laser satellite stations is either same or lower. According to calculations performed by experts, a laser of 1Watt can cause permanent destruction to a sensor, while the one with 40 watts would double or triple the damage. The odds might appear below, but they can increase. 

Soon, China plans on denying America and its allies the chance to view an image with a high resolution of roughly 10cm. 

Actions that the U.S. government needs to take in stopping the destructive lasers 

It should first examine the number of targets China requires in taking of fixed laser images in varying station distance of about 10 kilometers. 

Secondly, the U.S. military and intelligence examiners must weigh the costs of the risk of taking images from space of laser -secured targets. 

Thirdly, the U.S. must provide security to all images of required resolutions. In that manner, U.A. can use the commercial and all dedicated military structures during a crisis, war, or peacetime. 

Diversification of imagery providers will reduce or prevent any damage to their sensors, hence preventing China from launching missile attacks. 

Lastly, the U.S. should prolong the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as its service period will end in February 2021.